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abstract
This paper studies the relation between individuals’ mutual fund ﬂows and fund
characteristics, establishing three key results. First, consistent with tax motivations,
individual investors are reluctant to sell mutual funds that have appreciated in value
and are willing to sell losing funds. Second, individuals pay attention to investment
costs as redemption decisions are sensitive to both expense ratios and loads. Third,
individuals’ fund-level inﬂows and outﬂows are sensitive to performance, but in
different ways. Inﬂows are related only to ‘‘relative’’ performance, suggesting that new
money chases the best performers in an objective. Outﬂows are related only to
‘‘absolute’’ fund performance, the relevant benchmark for taxes.
& 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The mutual fund literature has long recognized that
investors respond to mutual fund performance and has
documented a robust, positive relation between net fund
ﬂows and past fund performance (e.g., Ippolito, 1992;
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Net
ﬂows, however, are differences of two nearly equally large
components—new purchases (inﬂows) and redemptions
(outﬂows)
1—that might well follow different patterns,
and aggregation into net ﬂows may preclude the devel-
opment of more detailed insights.
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1 During the period from 1984 to 2002, redemptions were almost as
large as new purchases, accounting for 48.5% of the sum of dollar
amounts of new purchases and redemptions. This ﬁgure is based on
authors’ calculations from the data reported in the 2003 Mutual Fund
Factbook (Investment Company Institute, 2004).
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ﬂows, as dictated by data availability,
2 a conventional
wisdom developed that the net ﬂow-performance relation
stems from the strong performance-chasing exhibited by
new buys, with little or no contribution to the relation
from the redemption side. That notion, however, is not
grounded in a direct inquiry into the patterns of inﬂows
and outﬂows, and it might well be that redemptions are
related to past performance. Also, inﬂows and outﬂows
might be related to other fund characteristics very
differently.
This paper studies the relation between individual
investors’ mutual fund ﬂows and a range of fund
characteristics (past performance, proxies associated with
potential future fund-driven tax liabilities, and investment
costs). We use detailed brokerage data featuring invest-
ments a large sample of individual investors made in the
period from 1991 to 1996. We ﬁrst study individuals’ fund
share redemption decisions in both taxable and tax-
deferred settings, and then proceed to study individual
investor fund-level inﬂows and outﬂows by aggregating
the purchases and redemptions from the brokerage data
by month and by mutual fund and thus decomposing
individuals’ fund-level net ﬂows into inﬂows and outﬂows
(as well as, in additional analyses, decomposing the latter
into outﬂows in taxable accounts and outﬂows in tax-
deferred accounts).
Individual investors’ mutual fund share redemption
decisions might be related to fund performance since
purchase for several (perhaps countervailing) reasons. For
one, there is the tax motivation. In the U.S., capital gains
are taxed on a realization basis, which provides investors
with an incentive to hold on to mutual fund shares whose
net asset value per share (NAV) has appreciated since
purchase (thus delaying the payment of taxes) and
redeem mutual fund shares whose NAV has fallen in
value since purchase (thus using those losses to reduce
taxes right away).
A belief in performance persistence could also lead to
holding funds that have appreciated in value since
purchase and selling those that have fallen since purchase.
Both tax motivations and belief in performance persis-
tence predict a negative relation between propensity to
sell and past fund performance, although tax considera-
tions matter only in taxable accounts.
On the other hand, psychological considerations seem
to play an important role in individuals’ trading decisions.
For example, the disposition effect—the propensity to
cash in gains and aversion to realize losses (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin and Statman, 1985)—would
lead to a pronounced positive relation between redemp-
tion decisions and fund performance since purchase.
Although the disposition effect appears to be a dominant
determinant of individual investors’ decisions to sell
common stock shares (e.g., Odean, 1998; Grinblatt and
Keloharju, 2001), there is little research inquiring whether
such ﬁndings carry over to mutual funds.
To disentangle these competing hypotheses, we focus
on the change of fund NAV since purchase. Naturally, that
performance measure, as important as it is for taxation
purposes and for psychological explanations, is unlikely to
be the only determinant of individuals’ redemption
decisions. Tax-sensitive investors might focus not only
on the direct tax consequences related to the change of
the fund NAV since purchase, but also on fund character-
istics that could provide information regarding future fund
distribution policy (such as turnover, past distribution
behavior, and capital gains overhang), information rele-
vant for taxable investors because the tax rate on
distributions received generally exceeds the tax rate on
capital gains realized in the future upon sale.
Individuals’ mutual fund share redemption decisions in
both their taxable and tax-deferred accounts might also
be sensitive to investment costs. The literature to date has
not focused on these sensitivities at the individual-
investor level. Rather, as in Barber, Odean, and Zheng
(2005), analyses focus on the effects that investment costs
such as expenses and loads might have on mutual fund
net ﬂows. However, as with fund performance, useful
insights may be gleaned by breaking net ﬂows into their
two components. For example, expense ratios might have
only a modest relation with net ﬂows, yet could have
strong positive effects both on ‘‘new’’ money ﬂowing into
the fund (e.g., high expenses could partly be used for
advertising to help attract new investors or could be
interpreted as a signal of quality of fund management or
services provided by the fund family) and ‘‘old’’ money
leaving the fund (e.g., in response to the higher ongoing
costs of maintaining the investment).
We establish three key ﬁndings. First, in stark contrast
with individual investor behavior in regard to common
stocks (Odean,1998; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001), there
is a negative relation between the likelihood of sale and
past mutual fund performance for mutual funds held in
taxable accounts. That is, investors holding mutual funds
in taxable accounts are reluctant to sell funds that
appreciated in value and willing to sell funds that have
fallen in price.
A comparison of trades in taxable and tax-deferred
accounts suggests that the negative relation can be
explained by tax-motivated trading (i.e., capital gains
lock-in and tax-loss selling) because there is no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant relation between redemption probability
and fund performance since purchase in tax-deferred
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2 The data collection of aggregate fund-level inﬂows and outﬂows,
available from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
electronic form since the mid-1990s, is onerous and very few studies
have pursued it (e.g., Edelen, 1999; Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002;
O’Neal, 2004; Cashman, Deli, Nardari, and Villupuram, 2006), and then
only, with the exception of Cashman, Deli, Nardari, and Villupuram
(2006), for a relatively small number of funds. The only other data set
that features the possibility of effective separation of net ﬂows into
inﬂows and outﬂows in the domain of U.S. mutual fund investments of
which we are aware, used in Johnson (2007), are transactions of
shareholders in one small, no-load mutual fund family. Although the
number of investors covered by that data set is substantial (well over
50,000), its limitation is a narrow representation of funds (up to ten
funds) and, thus, limited cross-sectional variation of their characteristics.
Finally, data on inﬂows and outﬂows are available for U.K. mutual fund
investors (Keswani and Stolin, 2008), although their use to date has been
limited to assessing whether ‘‘money is smart,’’ with separate con-
sideration of inﬂows and outﬂows.
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to play much less of a role in the domain of individuals’
mutual fund investments than they do in the domain of
investment in individual stocks.
In further support for tax-motivated trading, we ﬁnd
that taxable investors’ redemption decisions are sensitive
to proxies for future distribution behavior of the fund. In
taxable accounts, the fund turnover ratio, the historical
share of total fund returns distributed to the fund in-
vestors over the preceding ﬁve years, and the fund capital
gains overhang—three proxies for future fund distribution
behavior—are all positively related to redemption prob-
ability. By contrast, in tax-deferred accounts turnover
does not play a role in redemption decisions and the
relation between redemption probability and past fund
distribution policy is signiﬁcantly weaker than it is in
taxable accounts.
3
Our second key result is that mutual fund investors are
sensitive to both front-end loads (an ‘‘in-your-face’’ cost of
mutual fund investments) and expense ratios (a more
subtle, ongoing cost). The latter yields a ﬁnding that
differs from the conclusions reported in Barber, Odean,
and Zheng (2005), though the differential could be
attributed to the fact that we are looking into individuals’
redemption decisions, whereas Barber, Odean, and Zheng
(2005) focus on quarterly net fund ﬂows.
Our third key result stems from aggregation of
individual investors’ buys and sells into monthly mea-
sures of fund-level inﬂows and outﬂows. Consistent with
the notion that new money chases the best performers,
we ﬁnd that inﬂows are related only to funds’ relative
performance measures, that is, funds’ one-year perfor-
mance relative to other funds pursuing the same objec-
tive. On the other hand, as expected in light of the
transaction-level results, outﬂows are related only to
funds’ one-year ‘‘absolute’’ returns. The latter ﬁnding is
consistent with tax motivations, as it is the absolute
change in NAV that is relevant for taxable investors’ tax
liability following a sale. Thus, both new money and old
money are sensitive to past fund performance, but in very
different ways.
Finally, we also consider the role that the investment
costs play in the context of fund-level ﬂows. The most
striking ﬁnding is that individuals’ fund-level inﬂows and
outﬂows are each positively related to expense ratios—
whereas higher expenses may attract more new money
through advertising or a perception that higher expenses
reﬂect better managerial talent or fund family services,
they also prompt old money to leave the fund sooner than
it otherwise would. We also ﬁnd sensitivity to loads,
particularly for outﬂows.
These rich characterizations are obscured when in-
ﬂows and outﬂows are combined and only net ﬂows are
studied. Our results stress that the absence of a relation
between net ﬂows and a fund characteristic does not
imply that the characteristic is unimportant for all
investors. Indeed, given that new or potential investors
in the fund and the incumbent investors may have
different considerations, disentangling net ﬂows into its
components is important. The most glaring examples are
considerations of absolute performance, expenses, and
loads, all of which are of substantial importance to the
incumbent investors considering a sale of their fund
shares.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we review the data and present some summary
statistics. Section 3 presents the results of analyses that
relate probability of sale of individuals’ mutual fund
investments with a range of fund characteristics, includ-
ing past performance, determinants of future potential tax
liabilities, and investment costs. In Section 4 we aggregate
investors’ buys and sells of mutual funds into monthly
measures of inﬂows and outﬂows, and analyze the
determinants of those ﬂows. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data description and summary statistics
2.1. Data description
Our primary data set, trades that 78,000 households
made in the period from January of 1991 to November of
1996, comes from a large discount broker. Mutual funds
are the second most frequently used investment vehicle in
the data set, accounting for 18% of the overall value of all
the trades investors in the sample made over the six-year
period. They are second only to common stocks (which
account for around two-thirds of the overall value of the
investments in the sample). A number of households have
multiple accounts (such as one taxable and one tax-
deferred account); the median number of accounts per
household is two.
Around 32,300 households made at least one mutual
fund purchase during the sample period either in taxable
or tax-deferred accounts (IRAs and Keogh plans; retire-
ment plan accounts provided through employment such
as 401(k)-type plans are not part of the data set). For a
detailed description of the brokerage data set see Barber
and Odean (2000).
Mutual fund returns, rankings, and fund characteristics
come from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Open-End Mutual Fund Database and Morningstar.
We extract the relevant information regarding sample
funds’ investment objectives from the CRSP mutual fund
database ﬁelds ‘‘Objective’’ and ‘‘ICDI Objective.’’ Our
brokerage sample contains transactions covering more
than 1,100 different mutual funds across 200 different
mutual fund families that span more than 40 different
investment objective categories. We will control for
heterogeneity both on the individual-investor level, as
well as the mutual-fund-type level, by allowing sale
decisions to vary by the mutual fund family, by the
objective of the mutual fund, by whether the fund is
actively or passively managed (i.e., is it an index fund), as
well as by whether the transaction is in a taxable or a tax-
deferred account.
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3 Somewhat curiously, the redemption decision is sensitive to
capital gains overhang not only in taxable accounts, but also in tax-
deferred accounts (where tax motivations are absent).
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(2005), we include in our sample all mutual fund share
purchases (and follow the purchase to see whether there
is a subsequent sale), with one exception: in the instances
in which multiple buys are followed by a sale, it is not
possible to match unambiguously which purchased fund
shares actually have been sold without making assump-
tions such as FIFO (ﬁrst share bought, ﬁrst share sold) or
LIFO (last share bought, ﬁrst share sold), which by itself
could drive the results.
4 The exclusion of multiple buys
preceding an ambiguous sale reduces the number of
purchases in the sample by around 20%.
Also, in the instances in which multiple sales follow a
single purchase, only the ﬁrst sale is admitted into the
sample, which means that our analyses may slightly
understate the actual holding periods for these mutual
fund investments. However, that bias is negligible because
the vast majority of mutual fund sales in the sample (89%)
are complete liquidations of the respective positions.
2.2. Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics on mutual fund
purchases and subsequent sales in the sample. Applying
the criteria outlined above results in 325,185 buys made
over the sample period, representing 32,259 households
that had at least one mutual fund purchase during the
sample period. The numbers of mutual fund purchases in
taxable accounts and tax-deferred accounts, as well as
median dollar amounts of those purchases, are very
similar. Approximately one-third of the purchases were
followed by a sale during the sample period.
2.3. Graphical summary of hazard rates and past NAV
change
Fig.1 presents monthly hazard rates (i.e., the likelihood
of sale during a given month after purchase conditional on
having not sold up to that month) of individuals’ sales of
mutual fund shares held in their taxable accounts. The
two solid lines depict hazard rates conditional upon the
fund NAV having increased since purchase (gray solid line)
and hazard rates conditional upon the fund NAV having
decreased since purchase (black solid line) for each of the
ﬁrst 36 months following the purchase. For the purposes
of this ﬁgure we restrict our attention to all mutual fund
purchases in taxable accounts in January. This strategy
allows for identiﬁcation of end-of-year effects and other
patterns potentially related to the calendar month. We
obtain the conﬁdence intervals presented in Fig. 1 by
calculating standard errors that allow for heteroskedasti-
city as well as correlation across observations associated
with the same individual.
The ﬁgure identiﬁes two very pronounced empirical
facts that differentiate sales of mutual fund shares from
sales of common stocks (Odean, 1998; Grinblatt and
Keloharju, 2001). First, in stark contrast with common
stock investments, hazard rates conditional upon losses
exceed those conditional upon gains. Thus, on net,
psychological motivations such as the disposition effect
appear to play much less of a role in the domain of
individuals’ mutual fund investments than they do in the
domain of investment in individual stocks.
Second, hazard rates of selling mutual fund shares in
taxable accounts, although declining like the hazard rates
for common stocks, are signiﬁcantly smaller than those
for stocks. For example, in the ﬁrst few months the
unconditional hazard rates of selling mutual fund shares
are around 3–4%, whereas the comparable hazard rates of
selling common stocks start as high as 15% after one
month, 10% after two months, and 8% after three months
(Ivkovic ´, Poterba, and Weisbenner, 2005). This discre-
pancy suggests that high-frequency traders are not nearly
as present in the arena of mutual fund investments.
3. Analysis of redemption decisions
We proceed with analyses of the relation between
propensity to sell fund shares and a range of fund
characteristics, contrasting redemption behavior in tax-
able and tax-deferred settings. We begin by estimating a
Cox proportional hazards model of mutual fund share
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Table 1
Summary statistics of mutual fund purchases and sales.
The sample consists of 32,259 households that made at least one mutual fund purchase through a large discount broker during the period from January
1991 to November 1996. This table presents basic summary statistics (median dollar amount of purchase and number of purchases are reported in
parentheses).
Number of
purchases
Average $ amount of
purchases (Median)
Average # of purchases per
household, conditional on purchase
in that type of account (Median)
Percentage of purchases sold
during the sample period
All accounts 325,185 8,394 10.1 34
(3,000) (4.0)
Taxable accounts 180,564 9,376 8.5 33
(3,000) (3.0)
Tax-deferred accounts 144,621 7,169 7.2 35
(3,000) (3.0)
4 For example, in an upward market (as generally was the case
during much of the sample period) fund shares purchased ﬁrst in a string
of purchases would have a larger appreciation since purchase than the
last share in a string of purchases. Therefore, assuming FIFO would
induce a positive relation between redemption probability and past fund
performance.
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estimate the baseline hazard rate non-parametrically
(Han and Hausman, 1990; Meyer, 1990). The proportional
hazards speciﬁcation assumes that the hazard function
hi(t) for the sale of mutual fund investment i, t months
after the purchase, takes the following form:
hiðtÞ¼lðtÞneXi;tb, (1)
where l is the baseline hazard rate and X are the
covariates that shift the baseline proportionately.
One possibility would be to set the baseline probability
of sale over time to be the same for all investments i.
However, this would impose the constraint that all trading
decisions must conform to one general hazard function.
An improvement over the use of a common baseline
would be to allow investor-level heterogeneity by
enabling each individual to have a personal, investor-
speciﬁc baseline hazard function. This strategy would take
into account that, regardless of past performance and
other fund characteristics, some individuals simply are
more likely to trade than others. Loosely speaking,
allowing for investor-speciﬁc baselines in the present
context is similar to the inclusion of individual ﬁxed-
effects in a linear regression model.
We address these heterogeneity issues by using an
even more encompassing approach—we allow for sepa-
rate non-parametric baseline hazard rates for each
investor-mutual fund type combination. The fund type is
deﬁned by the interaction of a funds’ objective with its
degree of active management (index funds versus actively
managed funds) and its fund family membership.
5 Thus,
the regression results concerning past performance, for
example, will be identiﬁed by how a given individual trades
two funds with the same objective, fund family, and degree
of active management that have different performance since
purchase. Investor-mutual fund type baselines, therefore, are
a signiﬁcant step toward alleviating the concern that
investor and mutual fund heterogeneity and unobserved
characteristics may be driving the results.
The explanatory variables included in the speciﬁcation
that we estimate for observations in taxable accounts are:
Xi;tb ¼ b1   NAV_RETURNi;t 1
þb2   NAV_RETURNi;t 1   Decemberi;t
þb3   Decemberi;t
þb4   RelativePerformance Controls i;t 1
þb5   Future Distribution Controlsi;t 1
þb6   Cost Controlsi;t 1 þ i;t, (2)
where NAV_RETURN denotes the relative change in fund
NAV since purchase, deﬁned as NAV_ RETURNi,t ¼ NAVi,t/
NAVi,p 1. NAVi,p denotes the NAV of investment i at the
time of purchase and NAVi,t denotes its NAV at the end of
month t since purchase. All NAV values are adjusted for
splits. The percentage change in NAV since purchase
captures capital appreciation/depreciation of the fund
since purchase; it is the performance benchmark of direct
relevance for tax considerations. The indicator variable
December controls for end-of-year effects.
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Fig. 1. Hazard rates and the associated 95% conﬁdence intervals of selling mutual funds in taxable accounts. This ﬁgure displays the average hazard rate
for mutual fund share purchases conditional on whether the investors’ fund has an accrued capital gain since purchase (gray line) or loss since purchase
(black line) entering the month. The ﬁgure restricts attention to the observations initiated by January fund purchases in taxable accounts, a subset of the
sample of 325,185 purchases that 32,359 households made through a large discount broker in the period from 1991 to 1996.
5 There are 44 objectives and slightly more than 200 mutual fund
families represented in the brokerage sample, leading to slightly more
(footnote continued)
than 72,000 investor-mutual fund type combinations in the taxable
account sample. Thus, the hazard model includes 72,000 separate non-
parametric baselines (loosely speaking, 72,000 ﬁxed effects). On average,
an investor purchases two mutual funds in a particular objective-index-
family combination.
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ranking of one-year total returns within the fund’s invest-
ment objective and the fund’s Morningstar 5-star rating.
Future Distribution Controls are predictors of future dis-
tribution policy (turnover, past fund distribution policy, and
fund overhang) that capture indirect tax motivations. Finally,
Cost Controls capture investment costs (expense ratios,
front-end loads, and back-end loads).
Investors covered by the data set can have both taxable
and tax-deferred accounts (i.e., IRA and Keough plans;
investments in 401(k) plans are not part of the brokerage
sample). Under the assumption that the disposition effect
and the belief in fund performance persistence do not
differ across investments in taxable and tax-deferred
accounts, comparing the propensities to sell across
mutual fund holdings in the two types of accounts
provides a direct way of identifying the impact of taxation
because tax considerations should not affect trading
decisions in tax-deferred accounts.
6
Accordingly, we also estimate regressions over the full
sample of taxable and tax-deferred accounts. The model
allows for separate non-parametric baseline hazard rates
for each investor-mutual fund type combination, intro-
duced separately for an investor’s holdings in taxable and
tax-deferred accounts. We introduce an indicator variable
TAXi that denotes whether the mutual fund investment i
is held in a taxable account and interact TAXi with all of
the preceding variables:
Xi;ta ¼ a1   NAV_RETURNi;t 1
þa2   NAV_RETURNi;t 1   Decemberi;t
þa3   Decemberi;t
þ Other Controlsi;t 1  a4
þa5   NAV_RETURNi;t 1   TAXi
þa6   NAV_RETURNi;t 1   Decemberi;t   TAXi
þa7   Decemberi;t   TAXi
þ Other Controlsi;t 1  a8   TAXi þ i;t. (3)
In this regression, estimated over the pooled sample of
mutual fund investments in taxable and tax-deferred
accounts, the coefﬁcient a1 represents the sensitivity of
the sale decision to NAV performance since purchase in
tax-deferred accounts, the coefﬁcient a5 represents the
differential behavior in taxable accounts relative to tax-
deferred accounts, and a1+a5 equals the sensitivity of the
sale decision to NAV performance since purchase in
taxable accounts (which corresponds to the coefﬁcient
b1 from Eq. (2)).
We present the results of the regressions based on Eqs.
(2) and (3) in Table 2.
7 For presentational convenience, we
group our discussion of covariates into those related to
fund performance since purchase, relative performance
rankings, indirect tax motivations, and investment costs
(Sections 3.1–3.4, respectively).
3.1. Motivations for negative relation between sale
propensity and performance since purchase
The negative relation between the likelihood of sale
and past fund performance shown in Fig. 1 is consistent
with tax-related motivations. In taxable environments
(but not tax-deferred ones), a realization-based capital
gains tax system provides incentives to sell investments
that have fallen in price (‘‘tax-loss selling’’) and keep
investments that have risen in price (the ‘‘lock-in’’ effect).
Another plausible explanation for the negative relation
between the propensity to sell and performance since
purchase is investors’ potential belief in fund performance
persistence. If investors believe that funds’ past fund
performance is indicative of their future performance, on
the margin, they would be more likely to sell past losers
and hold on to past winners. This should be equally true in
taxable and tax-deferred (i.e., IRA and Keough) accounts.
In this section, we employ a hazard-model framework
in a setting with numerous controls for fund character-
istics to perform a detailed analysis of the negative
relation found in the parsimonious estimates displayed
in Fig. 1. We seek to differentiate between the alternative
hypotheses for the negative relation by considering the
results in taxable and tax-deferred settings. Finally, we
also analyze the effects of other fund characteristics.
The results of estimating the model from Eq. (2) across
all taxable mutual fund investments are presented in the
ﬁrst column of Table 2. Consistent with Fig. 1, evidence in
support of a negative relation is very pronounced
throughout the calendar year. The coefﬁcient for NAV_
RETURN is  0.78, suggesting that, in months other than
December, a 25% increase in NAV since purchase is
associated with an 18% decrease in probability of sale
(calculated as e
 0.78
*
0.25 1 ¼  0.18). The coefﬁcient for
NAV_RETURN*December is large and negative ( 1.21),
indicating that tax-motivated trading is the most intense
at the end of the year.
To gauge the economic signiﬁcance of the redemption-
performance relation, we perform a simple, back-of-the-
envelope calculation. According to the Investment
Company Institute (2004), over the past two decades the
ratio of aggregate sales to aggregate assets across all
equity mutual funds is roughly 30% on an annual basis.
The estimate that a 25% increase in NAV since purchase
reduces the probability of sale by 18% suggests that, in
case of such a NAV increase, total assets under manage-
ment would increase—very loosely—by about 5%
(30*0.18) on an annual basis through the decreased
redemptions, which constitutes a sizeable fraction of total
assets under management.
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6 This strategy is used in Ivkovic ´, Poterba, and Weisbenner (2005) to
study individual investors’ tax-motivated trading of common stocks. A
stronger disposition effect in taxable accounts than in tax-deferred
accounts would bias against, whereas a stronger belief in fund
performance persistence in taxable accounts would bias in favor of,
ﬁnding evidence of tax-motivated trading.
7 A potential selection issue might arise because the sample consists
of mutual fund trades placed by households that need not have both
taxable and tax-deferred accounts. To address this concern, we run these
analyses on a more restrictive sample of all mutual fund trades placed by
the more than 17,000 households that have both types of accounts and
(footnote continued)
ﬁnd that the results are very similar to those reported in Table 2,a
ﬁnding that is not surprising given all of the controls for heterogeneity of
investors already included in the model.
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deﬁnition equals total returns since purchase minus total
distributions since purchase. In an alternative speciﬁca-
tion, unreported for brevity, instead of including the
NAV_RETURN, we include both total returns since pur-
chase and distributions since purchase to check whether
distinguishing between the two makes a difference. The
coefﬁcient on total returns since purchase is  0.78
(S.E. ¼ 0.23, signiﬁcant at the 1% level), and the coefﬁcient
on total distributions since purchase is 0.85 (S.E. ¼ 0.50,
signiﬁcant at the 10% level). Their sum is statistically
indistinguishable from zero (p-value ¼ 0.90), implying
that if, for example, the fund earns a 1% return, yet
distributes it all to the investors (thus resulting in no
change in the NAV), there is no net effect on the likelihood
of sale. In other words, what matters to investors when
deciding to sell mutual fund shares indeed is the change
in ‘‘price’’ (NAV_RETURN), and not whether that price
stems from higher/lower total returns since purchase or
from lower/higher distributions since purchase.
However, this is not to say that past distributions do
not affect sale decisions. Indeed, the results also imply
that, holding total returns constant, the higher the
distributions since the fund was bought, the higher the
probability that the fund is sold (reﬂecting the mechanical
reduction in NAV). Moreover, as we discuss in Section 3.3,
long-term measures of past distribution policy (over the
past ﬁve-year horizon), which likely signal future dis-
tribution policy, are also positively related to sale
decisions.
Although the results we present up to this point
establish a very robust negative relation between propen-
sity to sell and performance since purchase in investors’
taxable accounts, considering only taxable accounts does
not enable us to disentangle the contributions of tax
motivations from other factors potentially related to
redemption decisions. Accordingly, we estimate a regres-
sion based on Eq. (3) that encapsulates trades in both
taxable and tax-deferred accounts.
Redemption decisions in tax-deferred accounts are not
related to the NAV change since purchase—the regression
coefﬁcient associated with NAV_RETURN in tax-deferred
accounts for non-December months is small and statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant. Moreover, the differential between the
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Table 2
Relation between redemption decisions and fund characteristics.
The Cox proportional hazards model employs a non-parametric estimate of the baseline hazard (i.e., the probability of selling the mutual fund in month
t after the buy conditional on no prior sale). The model features separate non-parametric baseline hazard rates for each investor-mutual fund type
combination, introduced separately for an investor’s holdings in taxable and tax-deferred accounts. The fund type is deﬁned by fund objective, degree of
active management (index funds versus actively managed funds), and fund family membership. NAV_RETURN is deﬁned as the relative change in NAV
since purchase. December is an indicator variable. The model also incorporates relative performance measures (funds’ percentile ranking of recent one-
year total returns within the investment objective, normalized to be between zero and one, and Morningstar rating), as well as proxies of future fund
distribution behavior (fund turnover, the fraction of total fund return over the past ﬁve years distributed to the investors, and fund capital gains
overhang). Finally, the model also includes the expense ratio charged by the fund at the time of potential sale, the front-end charge incurred at the time of
purchase (the ratio between the fee charged to the investor and the size of the purchase), and an indicator variable denoting the presence of back-end
loads for the respective fund investments at the time of potential sale. The estimation is based on 325,185 buys made during the sample period from 1991
to 1996, representing 32,259 households that made at least one mutual fund purchase through a large discount broker. Standard errors (shown in
parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across observations associated with the same transaction.
Taxable accounts All accounts
Tax-deferred accounts Interaction w/ taxable
NAV_RETURN  0.78*** 0.21  0.99***
(0.22) (0.20)( 0.29)
NAV_RETURN*December  1.21*  0.95  0.26
(0.70) (0.73)( 1.00)
December  0.11*  0.01  0.10
(0.06) (0.07)( 0.09)
One-year objective rank  0.10  0.11 0.01
(0.08) (0.08)( 0.12)
Morningstar rating 0.03  0.01 0.05
(0.03) (0.03)( 0.04)
Turnover 0.14**  0.02 0.17***
(0.04) (0.03)( 0.05)
Fraction of total returns distributed over past ﬁve years 0.66*** 0.29** 0.37**
(0.12) (0.13)( 0.17)
Overhang 0.36** 0.40**  0.04
(0.17) (0.16)( 0.24)
Expense ratio at time of potential sale 20.6** 14.2** 6.4
(9.4) (7.1)( 12.4)
Front-end load (Fee charged normalized by purchase amount)  27.4***  7.9***  19.5***
(4.4) (2.7)( 5.2)
Back-end load?  0.40** 0.01  0.41
(0.18) (0.19)( 0.26)
Number of observations 1,529,740 3,038,204
***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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large and highly statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that
the negative relation between the likelihood of redemp-
tion and past performance in taxable accounts is ex-
plained by tax-motivated trading. The lack of a relation in
tax-deferred accounts suggests that, to whatever extent
investor belief in fund performance persistence and the
disposition effect are present in the domain of mutual
fund investments, their net effect is such that theyentirely
offset each other (the negative relation resulting from
belief in fund performance persistence cancels out the
positive relation resulting from the disposition effect).
3.2. Effects of relative performance measures
Aside from the absolute performance of a fund since
purchase (which is germane for tax purposes in case of
redemption), also relevant for an investor may be the
performance of that fund relative to funds pursuing the
same investment objective. Indeed, investors are supplied
routinely with the information regarding fund perfor-
mance over certain investment horizons, as well as with
ratings based on such performance, and may incorporate
this information into their decision-making. The perfor-
mance measures that we consider are the percentile
ranking of recent one-year total returns within the
investment objective (normalized to be between zero
and one) and 5-star Morningstar rating, both of which are
commonly used in the literature (see, e.g., Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Bergstresser and
Poterba, 2002).
Relative performance measures have no effects on the
propensity to sell in either taxable or tax-deferred
accounts (after all, absolute and not relative benchmarks
are relevant for tax purposes). Thus, the sensitivity of net
fund ﬂows to relative performance rankings (e.g., Ippolito,
1992; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998)
seems to be driven by inﬂows, rather than by redemption
behavior (which we conﬁrm in aggregated-ﬂow analyses
presented in Section 4).
3.3. Indirect tax considerations
Tax-sensitive investors might focus not only on the
direct tax consequences related to the change of the fund
NAV since purchase, but also on fund characteristics that
could provide information regarding future fund distribu-
tion policy because the tax rate on distributions received
generally exceeds the tax rate on capital gains realized in
the future upon sale. Having discussed the tax implica-
tions of NAV changes since purchase in Section 3.1, in this
section we discuss the somewhat more subtle tax
implications that may stem from fund managers’ future
distribution behavior.
In our empirical analyses we employ three proxies
related to future distribution behavior. First, our speciﬁca-
tions include fund turnover. According to Frazzini (2006),
mutual fund managers exhibit behavior consistent with
the disposition effect, that is, they are likely to sell the
winners in their portfolios. Thus, turnover should be
positively related to future distributions because there
will be capital gains realized by such selling of the winners
from the fund portfolio. Accordingly, on the margin, there
should be a positive relation between the propensity to sell
taxable mutual fund investments (and thereby avoid future
distributions) and fund turnover.
Second, fund distribution policy might be highly
persistent, in which case past distribution behavior might
be indicative of future distributions. Thus, we construct
our second proxy to reﬂect the fraction of total returns in
the form of distributions over the past ﬁve years (months
t 61 through t 1) preceding the month of potential
sale t.
8 Finally, the fund’s capital gains overhang repre-
sents potential capital gains realizations that might be
realized, depending on the fund manager’s strategy and
liquidity needs, in which case they would lead to future
distributions and thus trigger a tax liability for the current
taxable fund investments. Therefore, the relation between
the propensity to sell taxable mutual fund investments
and fund capital gains overhang should be positive.
Our results further reinforce the importance of tax-
motivated behavior. In taxable accounts, the fund turn-
over ratio, the historical share of total fund returns
distributed to the fund investors over the preceding ﬁve
years, and the fund capital gains overhang are all
positively related to the sale probability. By contrast,
turnover does not play a role in sale decisions in tax-
deferred accounts. Moreover, the relation between sale
probability and historical distributions is also weaker in
tax-deferred accounts. Somewhat curiously, the sensitiv-
ity of sale decisions to overhang is virtually identical
across the two types of accounts. On net, the evidence
suggests that direct (has the fund price gone up or down
since purchase?) and more subtle, indirect (is the fund
likely to pay out high future distributions?) tax motiva-
tions both play important roles in individuals’ sale
decisions.
Another way of interpreting these results is that both
past and future distributions matter to investors. Both
increase the probability that old money leaves the fund.
Past distributions increase the probability of sale by
mechanically reducing the NAV_RETURN, whereas proxies
for future distributions increase the probability of sale
because of likely higher associated future tax liabilities
(with both of these effects much stronger in taxable
accounts).
3.4. Effects of costs of mutual fund investment
A priori, one might expect no relation between the
propensity to sell and front-end charges (once fund shares
are purchased, front-end charges are a sunk cost). On the
other hand, expense ratios (costs that investors incur on a
regular basis for as long as they hold the fund shares) and
back-end loads are costs still ahead for mutual fund
investors and they might alter the probability of
sale. Higher expense ratios imply a stream of higher
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8 It is deﬁned as the ratio (1+TOTAL_RETURNt 61, t 1 NAV_
RETURNt 61, t 1)/(1+TOTAL_RETURNt 61,t 1).
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and thus, ceteris paribus, could be related positively with
the probability of sale. By contrast, back-end loads can
readily be conceived as deterrents to sale.
Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005) consider the impact
of front-end loads and expense ratios on individual
investors’ mutual fund investment decisions, but they
limit their attention to the relation between net fund ﬂows
aggregated across a large number of individuals and
lagged values of expense ratios and front-end loads, rather
than on individuals’ decisions to sell the mutual fund
shares once they had acquired them. Barber, Odean, and
Zheng (2005) report that net fund ﬂows are sensitive to
in-your-face costs such as front-end loads, yet are not
sensitive to the more subtle, ongoing costs such as
expense ratios.
To explore the impact of investment costs, we consider
expense ratios charged by the funds at the time of
potential sale, front-end charges that investors incurred
at the time of purchase (expressed as the ratio between
the fee charged to the investor and the size of the
purchase), and an indicator variable denoting the pre-
sence of back-end loads for the respective fund invest-
ments at the time of potential sale.
First, the level of the expense ratio at the time of
potential sale increases the likelihood that the investor
will sell the mutual fund (effects are very similar across
taxable and tax-deferred accounts). For example, com-
pared to a fund with annual expenses of 50 basis points, a
fund with annual expenses of 100 basis points is 11% more
likely to be sold in taxable accounts ðe20:6n0:01=e20:6n0:005  
1 ¼ 0:11Þ, suggesting that individual investors are sensi-
tive to the ongoing, subtle costs of investments. This
sensitivity is economically signiﬁcant. Resorting once
again to the data provided by the Investment Company
Institute (2004) and performing another back-of-the-
envelope calculation, such a 50-basis point increase in
expense ratios loosely translates into a 3% decline
(30*0.11) of total assets under management on an annual
basis.
We also ran a speciﬁcation in which we break the
current expense ratio into the expense ratio at the time of
purchase and the change in the expense ratio since
purchase. In unreported results, we ﬁnd that both are
positively related to the propensity of sale and are
statistically signiﬁcant, with the coefﬁcient on the change
in the expense ratio of 54.6 (S.E. ¼ 16.3) being signiﬁ-
cantly greater in magnitude than the coefﬁcient for the
expense ratio at the time of purchase of 19.2 (S.E. ¼ 9.4).
Thus, investors who originally purchased a high-expense
fund are more likely to sell that fund at any point in the
future than are investors who purchased a low-expense
fund, with investors responding particularly strongly if
there was a change in the expense ratio since they made
the purchase.
Second, investors appear to view front-end charges as
an impediment to sale, potentially because they mis-
perceive the front-end charge as a marginal rather than a
sunk cost. The effect is more pronounced in taxable
accounts, but both types of accounts feature a large and
negative coefﬁcient on the front-end load variable,
suggesting that a front-end load of 5% reduces the
monthly likelihood of sale by 75% in taxable accounts
and 33% in tax-deferred accounts.
One might conjecture that this large effect simply
reﬂects investor heterogeneity—households that invest in
funds with front-end loads tend to have longer holding
periods. However, the speciﬁcation controls for consider-
able heterogeneity through investor-mutual fund type
effects (non-parametric baselines). Thus, the correlation
between front-end loads and sale decisions cannot simply
be attributed, for example, to buy-and-hold investors
purchasing funds with front-end loads. Rather, the
regression results are identiﬁed by how a given individual
trades two funds with the same objective, fund family,
and degree of active management that have different
front-end loads.
As a result, the front-end load effect likely does not
merely reﬂect investor heterogeneity and may instead
reﬂect investors’ sunk cost fallacy (i.e., a confusion of sunk
and marginal costs). Supporting this interpretation is
survey evidence we obtained for a separate, ongoing
project: nearly three-quarters of a random sample of 276
mutual fund investors that own funds with front-end
loads report the need to hold the fund long enough to
justify the front-end load; only one-quarter of the
surveyed investors report that, after the fund had been
purchased, the front-end load does not affect how long
they hold on to the fund.
Finally, there is some evidence that investors are
sensitive to back-end loads as well, but the results
regarding the presence of a back-end load are not quite
as strong as those for the front-end load. Whereas the
negative and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for taxable
accounts ( 0.40; S.E. ¼ 0.18) suggests that back-end loads
serve as a deterrent to sales, this does not carry over to
tax-deferred accounts, for which the coefﬁcient is vir-
tually zero (the difference between the coefﬁcients across
taxable and tax-deferred coefﬁcients, though, is not
statistically signiﬁcant).
9
4. Determinants of monthly fund inﬂows and outﬂows
The preceding section reveals a very rich characteriza-
tion of determinants of individuals’ transaction-level
mutual fund sale decisions. It shows that relative
performance is unimportant for redemption decisions;
the performance measure that does matter—consistent
with tax motivations and present only in taxable
accounts—is the absolute performance since purchase.
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9 The results concerning loads are very robust. In addition to the
speciﬁcations reported in Table 2, we explored alternative ways of
capturing sensitivity to loads. First, we ran a speciﬁcation in which both
front-end loads and back-end loads are captured with indicator
variables; we ﬁnd investor sensitivity to both types of loads in this
regression as well. Second, we ran a speciﬁcation in which, in addition to
front-end loads and back-end loads, we introduced an indicator variable
that captures the absence of loads altogether (that is, it captures no-load
funds). This additional no-load indicator variable was insigniﬁcant in its
own right; moreover, it did not alter any of the results presented in
Table 2 (the coefﬁcients on the original load variables were essentially
unchanged).
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because they are based upon very detailed, transaction-
level data.
In this section, we turn our attention to individual
investors’ fund-level ﬂows. We do so by aggregating all
purchases and all redemptions of a fund in a month to
compute dollar amounts of inﬂows and outﬂows, respec-
tively. We seek to better understand how inﬂows and
outﬂows, each possibly in a very different way, contribute
to the overall net ﬂow-performance relation previously
studied in the literature (e.g., Ippolito,1992; Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). We also analyze the
effects of loads and expenses on old and new money.
Our speciﬁcations will encapsulate both absolute and
relative measures of performance, as well as a range of
other covariates (the same ones we employed in Section 3).
Moreover, we also include three sets of ﬁxed effects into
the speciﬁcations to further alleviate concerns that
omitted variables, endogeneity issues, or selection issues
may be driving the results: time (monthly) ﬁxed effects,
objective/index fund ﬁxed effects,
10 and fund-speciﬁc
ﬁxed effects.
These steps advance the study of ﬂows along two
dimensions. First, we consider inﬂows and outﬂows
separately, an approach pursued by very few studies to
date. To our knowledge, the only studies that have done so
in the domain of U.S. investments
11 are Edelen (1999),
Bergstresser and Poterba (2002), O’Neal (2004), Cashman,
Deli, Nardari, and Villupuram (2006), and Johnson (2007).
Other than Johnson (2007), these studies rely upon SEC
data regarding monthly fund-level purchases and re-
demptions, available in electronic form since the mid-
1990s. The collection of these data is onerous and the
researchers, with the exception of Cashman, Deli, Nardari,
and Villupuram (2006), have limited their inquiry to a
relatively small number of equity mutual funds. Johnson
(2007) uses a different data set altogether—transactions
of well over 50,000 shareholders in one small, no-load
mutual fund family. The limitation of that data set is a
very narrow representation of funds (up to 10 funds) and
thus limited cross-sectional variation of their character-
istics.
Second, and more important, is the fact that, relative to
previous work, we create superior opportunities for
identiﬁcation of competing explanations through the
inclusion of a broader set of covariates (particularly those
related to performance) and controls. Indeed, none of the
aforementioned studies of inﬂow and outﬂow executes
the natural step of considering both absolute and relative
performance benchmarks, nor do they break out fund-
level outﬂows into those generated by taxable investors
and those generated by tax-deferred investors (a ﬁnal step
in our analyses that we employ to buttress our results
further).
To obtain measures of ﬂows, we compute the aggregate
holdings of mutual funds in the sample at the end of each
month and use them to scale the dollar inﬂows and
outﬂows (both are non-negative by convention) over the
next month as follows:
Inflowi;mþ1 ¼ Buysi;mþ1=Positionsi;m,
Outflowi;mþ1 ¼ Sellsi;mþ1=Positionsi;m; and
Net Flowi;mþ1 ¼ Inflowi;mþ1   Outflowi;mþ1, (4)
where Positionsi,m is the total sum of all households’
holdings of fund i at the end of month m, Buysi,m+1 and
Sellsi,m+1 are total sums of all sample households’
purchases and sales, respectively, of fund i in month
m+1. Finally, Inﬂowi,m+1, Outﬂowi,m+1, and Net Flowi,m+1 are
inﬂows, outﬂows, and net ﬂows for fund i in month m+1,
respectively, which we will often refer to as normalized
ﬂows.
A fund-month observation is admitted into the sample
if at least ﬁve households held the fund at the end of the
preceding month. In total, there are 18,038 fund-month
observations for which we have both complete sample
brokerage data and variables describing mutual fund
characteristics from CRSP and Morningstar. The median
number of households that hold a mutual fund at the end
of a month is 32 (with an average of 99). The total number
of funds appearing in the brokerage sample that we
employ to compute ﬂows is 529. Thus, our analysis is
based on a fairly wide cross-section of mutual funds in
existence at the time.
Our brokerage-level data provide an estimate of the
aggregate inﬂows and outﬂows of individual investors.
Given that individual investors hold about three-quarters
of U.S. mutual fund assets (Investment Company Institute,
2004), their behavior in large part determines total
mutual fund ﬂows. However, because the normalized
ﬂows calculated from the brokerage sample (computed
from investors’ buys, sells, and positions) are only
estimates of actual aggregate ﬂows, this will add some
imprecision, but not bias, to our regression coefﬁcient
estimates because we use these ﬂow estimates as
dependent variables in our regressions.
4.1. Flow-performance regressions: inﬂows, outﬂows, and
net ﬂows
We relate monthly fund-ﬂow variables to a range of
covariates that correspond to those we employed in the
previous section: one-year NAV returns preceding the
month,
12 relative performance measures, proxies captur-
ing future distribution behavior, and investment costs, as
well as indicators for the date (month), indicators for the
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10 Each investment objective is associated with up to two ﬁxed
effects—one for all actively managed funds with that investment
objective, and the other for all index funds with that investment
objective.
11 Data on inﬂows and outﬂows are available for U.K. mutual fund
investors (Keswani and Stolin, 2008). Their use to date has been limited
to assessing whether ‘‘money is smart,’’ with separate consideration of
inﬂows and outﬂows.
12 In the context of the individual-level transaction analyses from
Section 3, it was natural to focus on holding-period returns. In the
present analysis of fund-level inﬂows and outﬂows, there simply is no
direct equivalent of holding-period returns for aggregated purchases.
Therefore, we instead focus on the past one-year returns and thereby
facilitate direct comparison across net ﬂows, inﬂows, and outﬂows.
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and ﬁxed effects for the individual funds themselves.
The results of relating fund-level ﬂows to a range of
covariates are presented in Table 3. The table consists of
six columns; the ﬁrst two columns are devoted to inﬂows,
the next two to outﬂows, and the last two to net ﬂows. For
each ﬂow measure, the ﬁrst of the two columns features
the speciﬁcation in which one-year relative performance
is represented with percentile rankings of one-year total
returns within funds’ investment objectives (normalized
to be between zero and one). The second of the two
columns, in light of the non-linearity of the well-known
net ﬂow-(relative) performance relation (e.g., Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998), represents one-
year relative performance through indicator variables,
each denoting the decile of the percentile ranking of one-
year total returns within the fund’s investment objective
(the omitted group is the combined 5th and 6th deciles).
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 3
Aggregated ﬂow-performance regression.
The table presents regression results of relating monthly fund inﬂows, outﬂows, and net ﬂows from the brokerage sample to absolute fund performance
(expressed as the NAV return of the fund over the past year), its interaction with the December indicator variable, relative performance measures
(percentile ranking of performance over the past year within the investment objective, normalized to be between zero and one, and Morningstar rating),
proxies for future fund distribution behavior (turnover, fraction of total returns distributed over the past ﬁve years, and overhang), and investment costs
(expense ratio, front-end load, and back-end load), as well as indicator variables that capture time (month) effects, indicator variables for the fund’s
objective and whether it is an index fund, and ﬁxed effects for the individual funds. Inﬂows, Outﬂows, and Net Flows are computed according to Eq. (4)
from Section 4—in the sample provided by a large discount broker, covering the period from 1991 to 1996, the aggregated ﬂows of individual investors for
a given month are normalized by total holdings in the fund at the end of the prior month. For each of the ﬂows, the ﬁrst column features, among other
controls, the percentile ranking of performance over the past year within the investment objective, whereas the second column features a non-linear
representation of that ranking, expressed through indicator variables capturing its deciles (with the 5th and 6th deciles omitted). Standard errors are
shown in parentheses.
Inﬂow Outﬂow Net Flow
One-year NAV return  0.019  0.027  0.054**  0.058** 0.036 0.031
(0.035) (0.037) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
One-year NAV ret.   December  0.041  0.043  0.027  0.026  0.014  0.017
(0.105) (0.100) (0.038) (0.038) (0.099) (0.099)
One-year objective rank 0.037***  0.014 0.051***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
One-year objective rank bottom decile
a  0.008 0.009  0.017**
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
One-year objective rank decile 2
a  0.015  0.007  0.008
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
One-year objective rank decile 3
a 0.014 0.003 0.011
(0.017) (0.008) (0.014)
One-year objective rank decile 4
a  0.009  0.001  0.008
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
One-year objective rank decile 7
a 0.009  0.006 0.015
(0.011) (0.005) (0.010)
One-year objective rank decile 8
a 0.000  0.005 0.006
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
One-year objective rank decile 9
a 0.007  0.008* 0.016***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
One-year objective rank top decile
a 0.040***  0.004 0.044***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
p-value for joint sig.of rank deciles 0.00*** 0.37 0.00***
Morningstar rating 0.007 0.006  0.000  0.001 0.007*** 0.007**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Turnover 0.007 0.006  0.004  0.004 0.011** 0.010**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Fraction of total returns distributed over past 5 years 0.033 0.029  0.022  0.024 0.055 0.053
(0.064) (0.064) (0.043) (0.043) (0.37) (0.37)
Overhang 0.010 0.011 0.012** 0.012**  0.002  0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Expense ratio 22.7*** 22.9*** 11.5*** 11.6*** 11.2*** 11.3***
(4.9) (4.9) (3.3) (3.3) (3.0) (3.0)
Front-end load  0.21  0.25  0.53**  0.52** 0.32 0.27
(0.61) (0.60) (0.27) (0.26) (0.55) (0.54)
Back-end load  4.44*  4.28*  2.77**  2.74**  1.67  1.55
(2.34) (2.34) (1.16) (1.16) (1.98) (1.98)
Time (month) ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Objective & index fund ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.091 0.091 0.166 0.166 0.020 0.021
Number of observations 18,038 18,038 18,038 18,038 18,038 18,038
***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
a The omitted categories are deciles 5 and 6.
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net ﬂows is equal, modulo rounding errors, to the
difference between the coefﬁcients from the correspond-
ing columns describing inﬂows and outﬂows.
The top portion of Table 3 focuses on performance
measures. Consistent with the results from Section 3,
fund-level outﬂows are sensitive only to absolute returns.
As shown in the third and fourth columns, and as
predicted by tax motivations, the relation is negative
(the respective coefﬁcients, both highly statistically sig-
niﬁcant, are  0.054 and  0.058). These coefﬁcients are
large in magnitude and are economically signiﬁcant: a 10%
increase in NAV over the past year decreases outﬂows over
the next month by 0.5% of assets.
We ﬁnd no relation between fund-level outﬂows and
relative performance (in accordance with our results for
individual sale decisions discussed in Section 3). This
result is also in agreement with Bergstresser and Poterba
(2002) and Johnson (2007), who ﬁnd that outﬂows are not
related to relative short-term performance. Our overall
conclusions regarding fund outﬂows, however, differ from
those outlined in Johnson (2007), who concludes that
mutual fund share sales are idiosyncratic and are based on
investors’ liquidity needs. We, on the other hand, consider
both absolute and relative performance since purchase
and, consistent with tax motivations, ﬁnd a strong and
robust negative relation between the sale decision and
absolute fund performance in investors’ taxable accounts
both at the level of individuals’ mutual fund share selling
decisions (Section 3) and at the monthly fund-level
aggregation of outﬂows.
By contrast, inﬂows are sensitive only to a relative
measure of performance—one-year objective rank—with
no relation to absolute performance over the past year.
The corresponding coefﬁcient associated with the one-
year objective rank in the ﬁrst column is 0.037. The second
column shows the pronounced non-linearity of that
relation—the effect appears to be concentrated in the
top decile of relative performance, wherein being in the
top decile of performers in an objective is associated with
an inﬂow that is 3.3% higher than the inﬂow into an
otherwise identical fund with relative performance in the
9th decile. These results provide direct evidence of the
notion that new money chases past fund relative perfor-
mance.
Net ﬂows aggregate these tendencies in ways consis-
tent with the ﬁndings reported in the extant literature.
They are highly sensitive to relative performance. More-
over, the non-linearity of the relation with relative
performance, displayed in the sixth column, is very
pronounced. As for absolute performance, whereas the
point estimate of the relation between net ﬂows and past
one-year returns is positive, it is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant. What is obfuscated by focusing just on net ﬂows,
however, is that for a major subset of investors—the
existing investors considering whether to sell or continue
to hold the fund—there is a strong sensitivity between
ﬂows and absolute returns.
The coefﬁcients on variables characterizing future
distribution behavior of the fund (turnover, fraction of
total returns distributed over the past ﬁve years, and
capital gains overhang) are largely insigniﬁcant. On the
outﬂow side, only overhang is statistically signiﬁcant—as
in the transaction-level analyses from Section 3, its
relation with outﬂows is positive.
Finally, breaking net ﬂows into their two components
yields insights regarding the effect of investment costs as
well. In contrast with Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005),
our speciﬁcations uncover sensitivity of net ﬂows to
expense ratios; moreover, both inﬂows and outﬂows are
positively related with expense ratios, with the relation
being more pronounced for inﬂows. It appears that there
are two countervailing phenomena at play that, when
differenced for net ﬂows, still yield an overall positive
relation. Speciﬁcally, the effects of marketing (or poten-
tially a perceived signal of managerial quality and/or the
service provided by the mutual fund family embedded in
high expense ratios) appear to be strong when attracting
new buys and, at the same time, consistent with the
results from Section 3: existing investors are more likely
to sell mutual funds with high expense ratios.
The economic impact of the expense ratio is fairly
strong. A shift in the expense ratio equal to the
interquartile range of 0.6% increases the monthly normal-
ized outﬂows by 6.9% (11.5 0.006 ¼ 0.069), whereas it
increases the inﬂows about twice as dramatically—by
13.6% (22.7 0.006 ¼ 0.0136).
One potential explanation for the positive relation
between inﬂows and the expense ratio is that, consistent
with the Berk and Green (2004) framework, the expense
ratio (particularly the management fee component)
reﬂects the underlying quality of the fund manager and,
thus, the positive inﬂow-expense relation really reﬂects
an underlying positive relation between inﬂows and past
fund performance/quality (that is also picked up by the
expense ratio coefﬁcient). To differentiate between this
hypothesis and the ‘‘advertising’’ explanation for the
inﬂow-expense relation, in unreported analyses we break
the expense ratio into the 12(b)-1 fee (which, to a large
extent, represents fund advertising) and the non-12(b)-1
or ‘‘other’’ component (which, to a large extent, represents
the fund management fee). If advertising attracts new
money into the fund, the coefﬁcient on the 12(b)-1 fee
should be positive. If the quality of the manager attracts
new money into the fund and, according to the Berk and
Green (2004) framework, quality funds with good past
performance have raised management fees to extract
rents, the coefﬁcient on the ‘‘other’’ component of the
expense ratio should be positive. In the regression with
the expense ratio separated into its two components, the
coefﬁcient on the 12(b)-1 fee is 20.5 and the coefﬁcient on
the ‘‘other’’ component is 22.9 (both coefﬁcients are
highly statistically signiﬁcant), providing support for both
hypotheses.
For both front-end loads and back-end loads, the
results for the outﬂows are consistent with the transac-
tion-level results from Section 3. For front-end loads, as
discussed earlier, the negative relation between the
outﬂows and the front-end load could reﬂect a sunk cost
fallacy. The insigniﬁcant relation between net ﬂows and
back-end loads clouds the offsetting, large, and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant sensitivities across new investors
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associated with less new money entering the fund; at the
same time, they are also associated with the existing
money being less prone to leave.
In sum, many of the rich characterizations of investor
sensitivities to various fund characteristics discussed
above are obscured when inﬂows and outﬂows are
combined and only net ﬂows are studied. Our results
stress that the absence of a relation between net ﬂows and
a fund characteristic does not imply that the characteristic
is unimportant for all investors. Indeed, given that new or
potential investors in the fund and the incumbent
investors may have different considerations, disentangling
net ﬂows into its components is important. Thus, when
assessing the overall effect of a fund-policy change, it is
relevant to understand the differing sensitivities of new or
potential investors and existing investors who already
own shares.
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Table 4
Differences by tax status of outﬂows.
The table presents regression results of relating monthly fund outﬂows from the brokerage sample to absolute fund performance (expressed as the NAV
return of the fund over the past year), its interaction with the December indicator variable, relative performance measures (percentile ranking of
performance over the past year within the investment objective normalized to be between zero and one, and Morningstar rating), proxies for future fund
distribution behavior (turnover, fraction of total returns distributed over the past ﬁve years, and overhang), and investment costs (expense ratio, front-end
load, and back-end load), as well as indicator variables that capture time (month) effects, indicator variables for the fund’s objective and whether it is an
index fund, and ﬁxed effects for the individual funds. Outﬂows are computed according to Eq. (4) from Section 4—in the sample provided by a large
discount broker, covering the period from 1991 to 1996, the aggregated ﬂows of individual investors for a given month are normalized by total holdings in
the fund at the end of the prior month. Aside from the outﬂows computed across all accounts, we also compute outﬂows from taxable and tax-deferred
accounts. Panel A features the percentile ranking of performance over the past year within the investment objective, whereas Panel B features a non-linear
representation of that ranking, expressed through indicator variables capturing its deciles (with the 5th and 6th deciles omitted). Within each panel, the
ﬁrst column features outﬂows from all accounts (and is thus a restatement of the results from Table 3), the next two columns focus on outﬂows from
taxable and tax-deferred accounts, respectively, and the last column reports the differences between the two. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Panel A: Linear model of relative performance Panel B: Non-linear model of relative performance
All accounts
combined
Separate consideration of taxable and tax-
deferred accounts
All accounts
combined
Separate consideration of taxable and tax-
deferred accounts
Taxable
accounts
Tax-deferred
accounts
Difference Taxable
accounts
Tax-deferred
accounts
Difference
One-year NAV return  0.054**  0.293*** 0.020 –0.313*** –0.058** –0.295*** 0.018 –0.313***
(0.026) (0.089) (0.014) (0.092) (0.028) (0.088) (0.014) (0.090)
One-year NAV ret. x Dec. –0.027 –0.048 –0.009 –0.039 –0.026 –0.047 –0.009 –0.038
(0.038) (0.119) (0.032) (0.123) (0.038) (0.119) (0.033) (0.124)
One-year objective rank –0.014 –0.029 –0.003 –0.026
(0.009) (0.019) (0.007) (0.019)
One-year objective rank
bottom decile
a
0.009 0.019 0.016** 0.002
(0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.022)
One-year objective rank
decile 2
a
–0.007 0.009 0.006 0.003
(0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014)
One-year objective rank
decile 3
a
0.003 –0.001 0.006 –0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
One-year objective rank
decile 4
a
–0.001 –0.001 0.010 –0.011
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011)
One-year objective rank
decile 7
a
–0.006 –0.003 –0.004 0.007
(0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012)
One-year objective rank
decile 8
a
–0.005 –0.007 0.004 –0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
One-year objective rank
decile 9
a
–0.008* –0.012 0.006 –0.019
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012)
One-year objective rank top
decile
a
–0.004 –0.012 0.010 –0.022
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016)
p-value for joint sig. of rank
deciles
0.37 0.48 0.27 0.32
Other controls from Table 3? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.166 0.218 0.080 0.088 0.166 0.080 0.088 0.190
Number of observations 18,038 15,136 14,044 29,180 18,038 15,136 14,044 29,180
***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
a The omitted categories are deciles 5 and 6.
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taxable and tax-deferred accounts
This section features the last robustness check. Results
concerning the relation between outﬂow and perfor-
mance, presented in detail in Section 4.1, suggest that
the relation between outﬂows and performance is best
characterized by a pronounced role of tax motivations for
trade. Because our data enable us to disentangle outﬂows
from taxable and tax-deferred accounts, we can assess
this hypothesis even more directly—if tax motivations are
driving the result for outﬂows, then absolute performance
should matter only in the context of outﬂows from taxable
accounts. We carry out this robustness check and report
the results in Table 4. For brevity, we report only the
regression coefﬁcients related to absolute and relative
one-year performance.
Table 4 is divided into two panels. Panel A employs a
simpler, linear model of relative performance, and Panel B
employs a non-linear representation of relative perfor-
mance, as was done in Table 3. The ﬁrst column of each
panel features the regression results estimated over the
fund outﬂows aggregated over all accounts. Thus, the ﬁrst
column in Panel A (Panel B) corresponds to the third
(fourth) column in Table 3. The next two columns in each
panel feature regression results estimated for the outﬂows
computed from taxable accounts only and tax-deferred
accounts only, respectively, and the last column in each
panel features the difference between the two.
This robustness test of the hypothesis that tax motiva-
tions drive the relation between outﬂows and absolute
performance afﬁrms that interpretation very strongly. As
in Table 3, there is no ‘‘action’’ in the domain of relative
performance in either taxable or tax-deferred accounts.
This is true for both the linear speciﬁcations (Panel A) and
the nonlinear speciﬁcations (Panel B).
13 Absolute perfor-
mance, the central theme of this section, displays the
predicted pattern: it is substantially larger in magnitude
for outﬂows from taxable accounts ( 0.293 or  0.295,
depending upon the speciﬁcation) than for outﬂows from
tax-deferred accounts (0.020 or 0.018, depending upon
the speciﬁcation), and is statistically signiﬁcant only for
the taxable accounts.
Although not reported in the table for brevity, we also
test whether the other variables in the outﬂow regressions
(the proxies for future fund distributions and the mutual
fund costs) have statistically different effects for taxable
outﬂows than they do for tax-deferred outﬂows. There are
no statistically signiﬁcant differences across the coefﬁ-
cients in the taxable and tax-deferred regressions, with
the exception of three variables—the past one-year
absolute return (as discussed above), turnover, and over-
hang. Both the relation between outﬂows and turnover
and the relation between outﬂows and overhang are
stronger for taxable outﬂows (with both differences
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level). This is consistent
with these proxies for future fund distributions affecting
fund outﬂows because they may carry with them higher
tax liabilities.
5. Conclusion
This paper studies the determinants of mutual fund
ﬂows, with particular attention to individual investors’
mutual fund selling decisions. In stark contrast with
investor behavior regarding common stocks, there is a
strong negative relation between the probability of sale
and past mutual fund performance. Individuals hold on to
mutual fund shares that have appreciated since purchase
and are willing to sell those that have incurred losses. By
comparing trading patterns in taxable and tax-deferred
accounts, we conﬁrm that the negative relation can be
explained by tax-motivated trading.
Among a mutual fund’s choice variables are how
returns should be distributed to investors, with implica-
tions for taxable investments, and what kinds of fees—
expenses and loads—should be charged. Both have
implications for outﬂows from the fund. The evidence of
tax-motivated trading in taxable accounts encompasses
not only the negative relation between propensity to sell
and NAV change since purchase, but also increased
propensity to sell in response to three other variables
that signal potential future tax liabilities—fund turnover,
past distribution behavior of the fund, and capital gains
overhang. Thus, individuals seem to be sensitive not only
to direct tax considerations such as what taxes would be
incurred in the event of selling the mutual fund, but to
indirect tax considerations such as future distributions.
In regard to investment costs, somewhat surprisingly,
investors from our sample seem to view front-end charges
as impediments to sale. On the other hand, high expense
ratios (an ongoing, not-in-your-face cost) are associated
with a substantial increase in the probability of redemp-
tion, particularly if the expense ratio has increased since
the investor purchased the fund.
Finally, we also use the brokerage data to aggregate
individuals’ purchases and redemptions into fund-level
monthly measures of inﬂows and outﬂows and study the
determinants of ﬂows for inﬂows, outﬂows, and net ﬂows.
We ﬁnd that, broadly speaking, inﬂows are driven by
funds’ relative performance measures, that is, funds’ one-
year performance relative to other funds pursuing the
same objective. This suggests that new money indeed
chases the best performers in an objective, with no
relation to the fund’s ‘‘absolute’’ performance. On the
other hand, consistent with tax motivation and pro-
nounced only in taxable accounts, outﬂows are driven
by funds’ one-year absolute returns. Thus, breaking net
ﬂows into their two components yields important insights
on the behavior of old and new money.
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